Fast and Effective Robustness Certification for Recurrent Neural
  Networks by Ryou, Wonryong et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
13
30
0v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
7 M
ay
 20
20
Fast and Effective Robustness Certification for Recurrent Neural Networks
Wonryong Ryou 1 Jiayu Chen 1 Mislav Balunovic´ 1 Gagandeep Singh 1 Andrei Dan 2 Martin Vechev 1
Abstract
We present a precise and scalable verifier for re-
current neural networks, called R2. The verifier
is based on two key ideas: (i) a method to com-
pute tight linear convex relaxations of a recurrent
update function via sampling and optimization,
and (ii) a technique to optimize convex combi-
nations of multiple bounds for each neuron in-
stead of a single bound as previously done. Us-
ing R2, we present the first study of certifying a
non-trivial use case of recurrent neural networks,
namely speech classification. This required us to
also develop custom convex relaxations for the
general operations that make up speech prepro-
cessing. Our evaluation across a number of recur-
rent architectures in computer vision and speech
domains shows that these networks are out of
reach for existing methods as these are an order
of magnitude slower than R2, while R2 success-
fully verified robustness in many cases.
1. Introduction
Prior work demonstrated susceptibility of recurrent neural
networks (RNNs) to adversarial perturbations of its inputs
(Papernot et al., 2016). Naturally, this exposed serious se-
curity vulnerabilities in state-of-the-art speech recognition
models based on RNNs (Carlini & Wagner, 2018; Li et al.,
2019). As recurrent networks are widely used in other tasks
which require modeling long-term dependencies, such as
the games of Dota (Pachocki et al., 2018) and StarCraft
(Vinyals et al., 2019), verifying robustness of recurrent ar-
chitectures has become an important challenge towards de-
ployment of these models in practice.
In this work, we consider the problem of certifying robust-
ness of recurrent neural networks. We illustrate the prob-
lem setting and overall flow in Fig. 1. Here, the labeled rect-
angles represent the operations in the network we are certi-
fying. We focus on LSTMs as the most widely used form
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Figure 1. End-to-end certification of RNNs using R2: we show
how all possible perturbations are captured and propagated
through the system, then refined backward for better precision.
of RNNs, but the method can be easily extended to other
architectures such as GRUs. The “Preprocess” boxes cap-
ture domain-specific pre-processing operations (typically
present when using RNNs, e.g., speech processing). At
each timestep i, pre-processing receives a convex shape
s(i), which captures all possible inputs obtained by adding
perturbations to the original input. Certification of LSTMs
is then based on propagating these convex shapes through
both the preprocessing operations and the LSTM network
itself, and results in a convex shape in the output, denoted
as z. If z contains only output vectors which classify to
the correct class, robustness of the LSTM network is estab-
lished.
Key challenge: convex relaxations for LSTMs The key
challenge to effective certification of LSTMs is the design
of convex relaxations of non-convex operations: given a
convex shape capturing the hidden state h(i−1), to pro-
duce the shape capturing the next state h(i). A recent
method (Ko et al., 2019) computes this relaxation by us-
ing gradient-based optimization, but suffers from two ma-
jor issues. First, the optimization procedure is expensive
and does not scale to realistic use cases. Second, even if
we disregard scalability, the method lacks convergence and
optimality guarantees. To address these issues, we intro-
duce a novel technique based on a combination of sampling
and linear programming, which is significantly more pre-
cise and scalable than Ko et al. (2019), while also offering
asymptotic guarantees of convergence towards the optimal
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solution.
Refinement via optimization As mentioned earlier, to
certify the property, we need to verify if each concrete point
in the output shape z classifies to the correct label. If this is
true, then we have proved the output of the network is cor-
rect on all inputs in the input convex regions s(1), · · · , s(T ).
However, as in Fig. 1, when we propagate these shapes
through the network, due to over-approximation, it is pos-
sible to obtain an output shape z which contains spurious
incorrect concrete points (it intersects the red region repre-
senting incorrect outputs). To address this issue, we form a
loss based on the output shape, backpropagate the gradient
of this loss through the timesteps and adjust the convex re-
laxations in each LSTM unit to decrease the loss so that in
the next try we arrive closer to certifying the network. This
is demonstrated in Fig. 1 using the purple backward arrows
with the new convex shapes shown in purple. Finally, the
new output shape z′ (dashed purple) lies completely inside
the green region of the output space, meaning it contains
only (provably) correct output vectors and hence certifica-
tion succeeds. As we show experimentally, this method
significantly increases precision of end-to-end certification,
without introducing large runtime costs. We remark that
advances in certification introduced in our work are also
of interest beyond RNNs, especially the method to dynam-
ically choose between different convex relaxations.
Key contributions Our main contributions are:
• A novel and efficient method to certify robustness of
recurrent neural networks to adversarial perturbations.
The method is based on new convex relaxations which
handle non-linear operations in LSTMs, significantly
more scalable and precise than prior work.
• A novel method which dynamically selects between
multiple convex relaxations in order to increase certi-
fication precision.
• An implementation of the method in a system called
R2. We evaluated R2 on several benchmarks and
datasets, showing it scales to realistic networks. Fur-
ther, using R2, we were able to, for the first time, cer-
tify RNNs used in speech classification.
Related work While the first adversarial examples
for neural networks were found in computer vision
(Szegedy et al., 2013; Biggio et al., 2013), recent work
also showed the vulnerability of RNNs (Papernot et al.,
2016). Modern speech recognition systems, based on
RNNs, were shown susceptible to small noise crafted by
an adversary using white-box attacks (Carlini et al., 2016;
Carlini & Wagner, 2018), achieving 100% success rate
against DeepSpeech (Hannun et al., 2014). These were
later followed by inaudible attacks (Qin et al., 2019), uni-
versal perturbation (Neekhara et al., 2019), structural anal-
ysis (Yang et al., 2019), and adversarial music (Li et al.,
2019). While providing a good empirical estimate of the
vulnerability of RNNs, these works do not provide any ro-
bustness guarantees, which is the goal of our work.
Much recent work also aims at certifying neural net-
works, typically using SMT solving (Katz et al., 2017), ab-
stract interpretation (Gehr et al., 2018; Singh et al., 2018),
Lipschitz optimization (Ruan et al., 2018), linear relax-
ations (Zhang et al., 2018; Weng et al., 2018; Salman et al.,
2019; Singh et al., 2019a), symbolic intervals (Wang et al.,
2018b), semi-definite relaxations (Raghunathan et al.,
2018b) or combinations of methods (Wang et al., 2018a;
Singh et al., 2019c). Another line of work considers us-
ing these relaxations to train provably robust neural net-
works (Wong & Kolter, 2017; Raghunathan et al., 2018a;
Mirman et al., 2018; Gowal et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2020;
Balunovic & Vechev, 2020). However, they do not train
provably robust recurrent networks: to achieve this, our
convex relaxations could be combined with these training
methods.
There has also been recent work on certification of
RNNs. Akintunde et al. (2019) propose certification of
RNNs based on mixed-integer linear programming, but
it can only be applied to ReLU networks and does not
work for LSTMs, which have sigmoid and tanh activa-
tions. Wu & Kwiatkowska (2019) propose a discretiza-
tion method to certify video models that are a combina-
tion of CNNs and RNNs. However, discretization does
not scale to the perturbations we consider in our work.
Esmaeilpour et al. (2019) address the certification of sup-
port vector machines for audio classification, but do not
support neural networks. The most related work to ours
is POPQORN (Ko et al., 2019), which proposes a method
to certify RNNs. However, their approach is based on ex-
pensive gradient-based optimization, which does not scale
to practical applications such as audio classification, as we
show in our experiments. Lyu et al. (2019) propose to ad-
just the linear relaxations of activation functions, such as
ReLU, tanh, and sigmoid by using projected gradient de-
scent. Their approach shares the idea of learning the lin-
ear relaxation, but is restricted to feed-forward networks,
and does not consider the more challenging case of learn-
ing the convex combination of bounds for non-linearities in
LSTMs. Recent work also certifies Transformers (Shi et al.,
2020) using linear relaxations of non-linear operations in
that architecture. However, they do not consider using mul-
tiple linear relaxations as we do. Jacoby et al. (2020) pro-
pose to verify RNNs by automatically inferring the tem-
poral homogeneous invariants using binary search. How-
ever, their approach is limited to vanilla RNNs and does
not apply to more commonly used LSTM networks which
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we consider in this work.
2. Overview
In this section we use a small illustrative example to in-
troduce our certification method. Our goal is to certify ro-
bustness of a single LSTM cell with respect to the input
x ∈ [−1.2, 1.2]. In this example, for the sake of simplicity,
we assume there are two output classes and all intermediate
LSTM gates {i,f , g,o} share weight matrices and biases:
{i,f , g,o} =
[
1
0.5
]
x+
[
0
1
]
c = σ(i)⊙ tanh(g)
h = σ(o)⊙ tanh(c).
To certify robustness, we need to prove that h2 − h1 > 0,
implying the neural network classifies the input to label 2.
Interval bound propagation (IBP) The simplest ap-
proach is based on propagating concrete interval bounds
through the LSTM operations, disregarding the relation-
ships between variables. Using this method to certify the
network in our example, we obtain:
c1 ∈ [−0.64, 0.64] h1 ∈ [−0.43, 0.43]
c2 ∈ [0.23, 0.77] h2 ∈ [0.13, 0.54].
Using the above values results in the lower boundh2−h1 ≥
−0.30. Clearly, this inequality does not allow us to prove
h2 − h1 > 0, and results in the failure of certification.
Linear relaxation via linear program The main issue
with interval bounds is that they do not track relationships
between variables in the sequence of operations. To address
this, we compute lower and upper linear relaxations of each
non-linear operation in the neural network.
We demonstrate our approach for calculating a lower linear
relaxation of h2 = σ(o2) tanh(c2). The input domain is
o2 ∈ [0.4, 1.6] (note that o2 = 0.5x + 1 here) and c2 ∈
[−0.79, 0.62]. First, we uniformly sample the set of points
{(x1, y1), ..., (xn, yn)} from the input domain [0.4, 1.6]×
[−0.79, 0.62]. Then, we solve the following optimization
problem to calculate the lower linear relaxation of h2:
min
Al,Bl,Cl∈R
n∑
i=1
(σ(xi) tanh(yi)− (Alxi +Blyi + Cl)) ,
subject to the constraint that Alxi + Blyi + Cl ≤
σ(xi) tanh(yi) for each i. This is a linear program that can
be solved efficiently in polynomial time. However, the ob-
tained boundmay not be sound as the sampled points do not
fully cover the continuous input domain. To address this,
we shift the plane downwards by an offset (decreasing Cl)
equal to the maximum violation between Alx + Bly + Cl
and h2. After solving the linear program and the adjust-
ment, we obtain Al = 0.02, Bl = 0.48, Cl = 0.00
which results in the following lower linear relaxation to h2:
h2 ≥ LBh2 = 0.02o2 + 0.48c2 + 0.00. We compute the
upper bound analogously.
Note that prior work (Ko et al., 2019) uses more ex-
pensive gradient-based optimization to obtain coefficients
Al, Bl, Cl which is orders of magnitude slower than our ef-
ficient method based on linear programming.
After computing a linear relaxation of each neuron, we cal-
culate via back-substitution, the lower bound of h2 − h1
≥ (0.02o2 + 0.48c2 + 0.00)− (0.12o1 + 0.22c1 + 0.15)
≥ 0.02o2 + 0.48(0.18i2 + 0.38g2 − 0.12)
− 0.12o1 − 0.22(0.18i1 + 0.17g1 + 0.23)− 0.15
≥ 0.29(0.5x+ 1)− 0.20x− 0.25
≥ −0.06x+ 0.04 ≥ −0.03.
While we obtain more precise bounds than intervals, this
linear relaxation is not enough to certify robustness.
Optimization through multiple relaxations While our
method based on linear programming offers efficient ways
to compute linear relaxations of key functions, its main lim-
itation is that it is static: if certification fails, there is no way
to revisit the bounds and try again. In this work, we intro-
duce a method which, upon failure of certification, makes a
backward pass and adjusts the bounds to increase precision
of the certification. Here, we calculate 4 additional planes
for each bound, which we refer to as candidate bounds. We
split the original input region [lx, ux] × [ly, uy] along two
diagonals into 4 triangular regions which we denote as Tk,
k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. We also set T0 equal to the full region. For
each Tk we now perform the same sampling and optimiza-
tion procedure as before:
min
Al,Bl,Cl∈R
n∑
i=1
(σ(xi) tanh(yi)− (Alxi +Blyi + Cl))
subject to
n∧
i=1
Alxi +Blyi + Cl ≤ σ(xi) tanh(yi)
where (xi, yi) ∼ T
k
Finally, for each Tk, we obtain the following five candidate
linear relaxations:
h1 ≥ LB
0
h1
= 0.12o1 + 0.69c1 − 0.16
h1 ≥ LB
1
h1
= −0.16o1 + 0.21c1 − 0.20
h1 ≥ LB
2
h1
= −0.04o1 + 0.21c1 − 0.08
h1 ≥ LB
3
h1
= −0.16o1 + 0.21c1 − 0.20
h1 ≥ LB
4
h1
= 0.19o1 + 0.60c1 − 0.27
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Figure 2. Visualization of the z = σ(x) tanh(y) curve and the
upper bound computed by linear programming. Red crosses rep-
resent the sampled points and dashed arrows show the difference
between the curve and the plane (summands in the optimization).
Note that LB0h1 denotes the linear relaxation calculated
from the whole region. The resulting lower bound LBh1
is
LBh1 =
4∑
k=0
λi · LB
k
h1
,
4∑
k=0
λi = 1.
Our optimization algorithm, explained later in Section 3.2,
produces λ = (0.34, 0.08, 0.16, 0.25, 0.18). Using this ap-
proach, we can prove that h2 − h1 ≥ 0.02 > 0, enabling
us to certify robustness of the LSTM network.
Compared to Ko et al. (2019), which commit to a single
bound, our method is more flexible and can tune λ param-
eters to find a combination of 5 different bounds for each
neuron that yields the most precise certification result.
3. Scalable Certification of LSTMs
In this section, we give technical details of our method for
certification of LSTM networks. We first explain how to
obtain tight linear bounds on key operations in the LSTM
unit: σ(x) tanh(y) and σ(x)y. Then, we present a novel
method to dynamically choose between different convex re-
laxations in order to increase the precision of the certifier.
3.1. Computing linear relaxation of LSTM operations
Here, our goal is to bound the product of sigmoid and tanh,
using lower and upper bound planes parameterized by co-
efficients Al, Bl, Cl and Au, Bu, Cu, respectively:
Alx+Bly + Cl ≤ σ(x) tanh(y) ≤ Aux+Buy + Cu
We formulate the search for a lower bound of σ(x) tanh(y)
as an optimization problem with the aim to minimize the
volume between the bound and the function, subject to the
constraint that the lower bound is below the function value:
min
Al,Bl,Cl
∫
(x,y)∈B
(σ(x) tanh(y)− (Alx+Bly + Cl))
subject to Alx+Bly + Cl ≤ σ(x) tanh(y), ∀(x, y) ∈ B.
(1)
Here, we denoteB = [lx, ux]×[ly, uy] as the boundaries of
input neurons x and y. Prior work (Ko et al., 2019) solves
this optimization problem using gradient-based methods
which is both expensive and lacks convergence guarantees.
Instead, we propose to solve Eq. (1) via sampling and lin-
ear programming, which is significantly faster and more
precise than prior work, as we demonstrate experimentally.
Step 1: Approximation via LP In the first step, we
solve an approximation of an intractable optimization prob-
lem from Eq. (1), obtaining potentially unsound con-
straints. We build on the approach from Balunovic et al.
(2019) which proposes to approximate the objective in
Eq. (1) using Monte Carlo sampling. Let D =
{(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)} be a set of points fromB sampled
uniformly at random. We phrase the following optimiza-
tion problem:
min
Al,Bl,Cl∈R
n∑
i=1
(σ(xi) tanh(yi)− (Alxi +Blyi + Cl))
subject to
n∧
i=1
Alxi +Blyi + Cl ≤ σ(xi) tanh(yi). (2)
In Fig. 2 we show an input region with Monte Carlo sam-
ples as red circles and summands in the LP objective as ver-
tical lines. As this is a linear program (LP), we can solve it
exactly in polynomial time using off-the-shelf LP solvers.
We compute an upper bound analogously.
Step 2: Adjusting the offset to guarantee soundness
Due to the LP approximation, the resulting lower bound
from the previous step may contain the point where the
lower bound has a higher value than the true function, mak-
ing it unsound. Balunovic et al. (2019) address this by
computing the maximum soundness violation and adjust-
ing the lower bound plane downwards to guarantee sound-
ness. However, they use expensive branch-and-bound tech-
nique which do not scale to our setting. Instead, we
show that in the case of the function σ(x) tanh(y), we
can compute the maximum violation using a closed-form
solution in constant time. More formally, let ∆l =
max(x,y)∈B σ(x) tanh(y)− (Alx+Bly+Cl) be obtained
using our closed-form formula. Then, we adjust the lower
bound downwards by updating the offset Cl ← Cl − ∆l,
resulting in a sound lower bound plane. We also update the
upper bound analogously. Fig. 2 shows the upper bound
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Figure 3. Learning to combine linear bounds via gradient descent.
Here the 5 candidate planes multiplied by λ are depicted either
in green or red, or both. Green represents the sampled domain,
Tk, and red is the extension of the obtained green plane out of the
domain. With the linear combination of the planes, we compute
the bound, calculate the loss, and backpropagate.
plane obtained after solving the LP and adjusting the off-
set. Finally, we can prove that, similarly to Balunovic et al.
(2019), as we increase the number of samples n, the solu-
tion of the LP asymptotically approaches the solution of the
original problem from Eq. (1). We provide more details in
Appendix.
3.2. Optimizing the combination of bounds
While our approach is based on sampling, linear program-
ming and offset adjustment allow us to obtain an (asymptot-
ically) optimal lower bound plane, it still has a fundamental
limitation that it produces a single lower bound plane. Al-
though the lower bound plane from Section 3.1 is optimal
in terms of volume, this approach is, in a sense, greedy:
when considering the entire network, it is possible that
we can select non-optimal planes for each neuron, which
yield more precise result in the end. Neither the method
from Ko et al. (2019) nor our method from Section 3.1 can
achieve this – we now present the first approach which can
learn how to select bounds for the entire network so as to
increase end-to-end precision of the certification.
Step 1: Compute a set of candidate bounds In the first
step, we adapt our approach from Section 3.1 to produce
a diverse set of candidate planes instead of a single plane.
At a high level, we are going to run our Monte Carlo sam-
pling procedure several times, each time on a different sub-
domain of the original domainB = [lx, ux]× [ly, uy] (how-
ever the constraints are still enforced over the entire do-
main). We define 4 different triangular subdomains: T1 and
T2 are triangles resulting from splitting B along the main
diagonal, while T3 and T4 are triangles resulting from split-
ting B along the other diagonal. We additionally define
T0 = B.
Now, for each k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, we perform sampling and
optimization as in Eq. (2), this time sampling from Tk:
min
Al,Bl,Cl∈R
n∑
i=1
(σ(xi) tanh(yi)− (Alxi +Blyi + Cl))
subject to
n∧
i=1
Alxi +Blyi + Cl ≤ σ(xi) tanh(yi)
where (xi, yi) ∼ Tk
Additionally, for each k we also enforce the constraints at
the corners of B. For each neuron i, this yields 5 candidate
lower bound and upper bound planes, LBki and UB
k
i for
k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. These 5 candidate planes for each of the
N neurons are shown in Fig. 3.
Step 2: Find the optimal combinations of the bounds
After computing a set of candidate bounds, in the next step
our goal is to learn a convex combination of these bounds
which yields the highest end-to-end certification precision.
To do this, we define lower and upper bound of neuron i as
a convex combination of the proposed 5 bounds:
LBi =
4∑
k=0
λLBi · LB
k
i ,
4∑
k=0
λLBi = 1,
UBi =
4∑
k=0
λUBi · UB
k
i ,
4∑
k=0
λUBi = 1.
Recall that we formulate robustness certification as proving
that for all labels i different from the ground truth label t:
zt − zi > 0
Here, the lower bound on zt − zi is computed using
back-substitution (Singh et al., 2019b), as shown in our
overview example in Section 2. However, this lower bound
now depends on the coefficients λ, so we define function
f(x, ǫ, i, λ˜)which computes the lower bound of the expres-
sion zt − zi when using λ to combine the neuron bounds.
We describe our approach to find the best coefficients λ in
Algorithm 1. In order to find λ, we solve the following
optimization problem for each label i:
zt − zi ≥ max
λ
f(x, ǫ, i,λ)
If the solution to the above optimization problem is posi-
tive, then we have established robustness with respect to
the class i. First, we initialize unnormalized λ˜ for each neu-
ron uniformly between -1 and 1. Then, in each epoch we
compute the normalized λ by applying softmax to λ˜ and
Fast and Effective Robustness Certification for Recurrent Neural Networks
Algorithm 1 Learning λ via gradient descent
Given input x, label y, modelM, perturbation ǫ
for i← 1 tom where i 6= y do
Initialize λ˜ ∼ [−1, 1]Nbounds×5.
epoch← 0
repeat
λ← SoftMax(λ˜)
L ← −f(x, ǫ, i, λ˜)
λ˜← λ˜− α∇
λ˜
L
epoch← epoch+ 1
until epoch = max_epoch or L ≥ 0
if L ≥ 0 then
return not certified
end if
end for
return certified
then run the certification using λ, obtaining loss L equal to
the value −f(x, ǫ, i,λ). We then perform gradient descent
update on λ¯ based on the loss. If at some point the loss is
negative, it means we have just found λ which enables us
to prove robustness and the algorithm terminates. The core
updating flow is also shown visusally in Fig. 3.
Note that, although we use gradient-based methods in cer-
tification as (Ko et al., 2019), the ideas are fundamentally
different: in terms of runtime, we apply the optimization
for each label which is typically at most 10 times per input,
while they optimize for each σ(x) tanh(y) operation which
too expensive for networks consisting of thousands of neu-
rons. Further, we use optimization to adjust the bounds,
while they use it to obtain a single bound, which produces
even worse results than our method from Section 3.1.
4. Certification of Speech Preprocessing
We demonstrate the scalability of R2 by certifying, for
the first time, the robustness of a speech classifier using
LSTMs. Though there have been various works which
operate directly on the raw signal (Pascual et al., 2017;
Sainath et al., 2015), the filterbank method, or log Mel-
filterbank energy, is most widely used speech preprocess-
ing. The key challenge in the speech domain is to design
linear convex relaxations for the non-linear operations in
the preprocessing. The idea of filterbank is to model non-
linear human acoustic perception as power spectrum fil-
ters based on certain frequencies, called Mel-frequencies.
The final result of the transformation is a vector of coeffi-
cients whose elements contain log-scaled values of filtered
spectra, one for every Mel-frequency. Sahidullah & Saha
(2012) presented an approach to represent most computa-
tions, such as pre-emphasizing and FFT, using matrix mul-
tiplications. Below we discuss the main steps for handling
UBy = (ux + lx)x− uxlx
LBy = 4lxx− 4l
2
x
lx ux
(a) Linear relaxation for square function.
LBy = log lx +
x−lx
ux−lx
log ux
lx
UBy =
2x
ux+lx
− 1 + log ux+lx
2
lx
ux
(b) Linear relaxation for log function.
Figure 4. Two relaxations for the speech preprocessing stage.
non-linear preprocessing operations.
Square To handle L2 norm computation, we provide linear
relaxation of the square function, shown in Fig. 4a. We
calculate the lower and upper linear bounds of y = x2,
where x ∈ [lx, ux], as:
LBy =


4lxx− 4l
2
x 0 ≤ lx < ux/3
4uxx− 4u
2
x 0 ≥ 3ux > lx
0 lx ≤ 0 ≤ ux
(ux + lx)x− ((ux + lx)/2)
2 o.w.
UBy = (ux + lx)x− uxlx.
Log To handle computation of the logarithm of the power
spectrum, we provide linear relaxation of the log function,
shown in Fig. 4b. We calculate the lower and upper linear
bounds of y = log x, where x ∈ [lx, ux], as:
LBy = log lx +
x− lx
ux − lx
log
ux
lx
UBy =
2x
ux + lx
− 1 + log
ux + lx
2
.
5. Experimental Evaluation
We now evaluate the effectiveness of R2 for certifying
LSTM networks.
Setup We implemented R2 in PyTorch (Paszke et al.,
2017) and used Gurobi 9.0 to solve linear programs. Com-
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parisons with POPQORN and scalability tests are per-
formed on a single Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 GPU. We
use single Nvidia GeForce RTX 2080 GPU for the remain-
ing experiments. Following convention from prior work
(Singh et al., 2019b), we consider only those inputs that
were correctly classified without perturbation. We use the
same set of hyperparameters for all experiments. We use
100 sampling points in the linear program and optimize
λ parameters using Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014) for 200
epochs. During optimization, we initialize the learning rate
to 100 and multiply it by 0.98 after every epoch.
5.1. Image classification
We first evaluate R2 on the image classification task pro-
posed by Ko et al. (2019). They use the MNIST dataset
(LeCun et al., 2010) and flatten each image into a vector of
dimension 784. Then, this vector is partitioned into a se-
quence of k frames (k depends on the experiment). This
frame sequence is then used as an input to the LSTM.
Comparison with POPQORN We now compare pre-
cision and scalability of R2 with POPQORN (Ko et al.,
2019). We closely follow the evaluation setup used in the
experiments of Ko et al. (2019). We trained an LSTM net-
work containing 1 layer with 32 hidden units using stan-
dard training and achieved accuracy of 94.8%. The net-
work receives a sequence of k = 7 image slices as in-
put and predicts a digit corresponding to the image. We
evaluate three methods: POPQORN (Ko et al., 2019), our
first method based on sampling and linear programming
from Section 3.1, denoted as R2 (LP), and our second
method based on optimization of the bounds from Sec-
tion 3.2, denoted as R2 (OPT). Note that OPT also uses
LP as its subroutine, as explained in Section 3.2.
As POPQORN is slow, we evaluate this experiment only on
10 correctly classified images randomly sampled from the
test set. For each frame index i and each method, we com-
pute the maximum ǫ such that the method can certify that
LSTM is robust to perturbations up to ǫ in the L∞-norm of
the i-th slice of the image. For each method, we compute
this maximum ǫ that can be certified using the same binary
search procedure as in Ko et al. (2019).
We show the results of this experiment in Fig. 5. First,
we observe that perturbations in early frames allow us to
certify much smaller ǫ than that in later frames. This is
because the approximation error on frame 1 propagates
through the later frames to the classifying layer while the er-
ror on frame 7 only affects the last layer. Across all frames,
both our methods, LP and OPT, outperform POPQORN.
We can also see that OPT which can dynamically adjust
the bounds can prove more than LP, which uses fixed sin-
gle linear relaxation per neuron.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0.00
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0.10
0.15
Frame index
Maximum pertubation ǫ per frame
R2 (OPT)
R2 (LP)
POPQORN
Figure 5. Results for the comparison between R2 and POPQORN.
Plotted points represent the maximum L∞ norm perturbation for
each frame index 1 through 7.
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Figure 6. Certification of several LSTM models using R2.
F F_HH_LL in the label stands for a model consisting of F
frames, H hidden units in an LSTM cell, and L layers in the
LSTM.
We next compare runtimes of the three methods on pertur-
bations in the first frame – most challenging as it requires
propagating through all timesteps. Here, R2 (LP) takes
37 seconds, R2 (OPT) takes 275 seconds and POPQORN
takes 2156 seconds per example. Based on this, we
conclude that both variants of R2 are more precise than
POPQORN while being 50× (for LP) and 8× more scal-
able (for OPT).
Scalability demonstration with MNIST In this exper-
iment, we evaluate the scalability of R2 by certifying sev-
eral recurrent architectures, with varying number of frames,
hidden units and LSTM layers. All models have accuracy
in the range 96.46± 0.49%. For each network, we certify
first 100 correctly classified images using the same pertur-
bation ǫ = 0.01 for all frames, with 3 repetitions. While in
Fast and Effective Robustness Certification for Recurrent Neural Networks
0.007 0.010 0.013 0.016 0.019
0
20
40
60
80
100
ǫ
Certified(%)
R2 (OPT)
R2 (LP)
(a) MNIST precision
0.007 0.010 0.013 0.016 0.019
0
50
100
150
ǫ
Running time(s)
R2 (OPT)
R2 (LP)
(b) MNIST runtime
Figure 7. Performance plots of MNIST dataset. All tests are done
with 07F_032H_2L.
the previous experiment we certified each frame separately
to closely follow the setup from (Ko et al., 2019), it is more
natural to assume the adversary is able to perturb the entire
input.
We show our results in Fig. 6. Here we first observed
the precision of R2 is affected mostly by the number of
frames as the precision loss accumulates along the frames.
Naturally, running time increases with the number of neu-
rons and frames, as R2 is optimizing the bounds for each
σ(x) tanh(y) operation.
However, we also observed a counter-intuitive phe-
nomenon that R2 (OPT) performs better with multiple-
layers models than the single-layer model. We performed
another experiment with R2 (LP) and found the preci-
sion just slightly drops except for 04F_032H_2L and
04F_032H_3L as R2 (LP) results in around 80% precision
for both models. Our hypothesis is that an increased num-
ber of trainable parameters enhances the flexibility of the
bounds for the optimization, allowing us to find more com-
binations of the bounds which allow certification of the in-
put.
We also tried to plug-in the POPQORN bounds, but it re-
sults in precision of 83% and takes an average of 1150 sec
per input, even for our smallest model, 04F_032H_1L. As
shown in Fig. 6, R2 proves 94.3% for the same model in
10.83 seconds.
Performance demonstration with image classification
In the next experiment, we certify robustness of theMNIST
classifier for different ǫ values. We evaluated on 100 cor-
rectly classified samples from the test set, performing 10
repetitions. We show our results in Fig. 7. R2 signifi-
cantly improves the precision: for example for ǫ = 0.013
in Fig. 7a, LP proves 17.7% while OPT certifies 91.4% of
samples. These results confirm that learning the bounds dy-
namically has a large impact on certification precision. In
terms of runtime shown in Fig. 7b, OPT naturally consumes
more time than LP, but this is justified by the significant in-
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Figure 8. Performance plots of FSDD dataset. All tests are done
with the same architecture described in the text.
crease in precision.
5.2. Speech classification
In the next experiment, we certify robustness of a speech
classifier on the FSDD dataset (Jackson, 2019).FSDD con-
sists of recordings of digits spoken by 4 different speakers,
recorded at 8kHz.Unlike the MNIST task, these tasks are
more challenging for LSTM certification as the speech sig-
nal is naturally a time series data with variable length. Here
we evaluated on the full test set consisting of 200 samples
for FSDD, and thus there was no need for repetitions. As
POPQORN does not handle speech preprocessing and is
too slow for handling long speech signals, we evaluated
only our methods.
Preprocessing As mentioned before, one of the key chal-
lenges in speech classification, not encountered in the vi-
sion domain, is the presence of a complex preprocessing
stage before the input is passed to the LSTM network.
The preprocessing stage in this experiment consists of FFT
and Mel-filter transformations. Preprocessed input is then
passed through the fully connected layer with ReLU acti-
vation, and then through the LSTM unit. We used the fol-
lowing parameters for the preprocessing: we slice the raw
wav signal with length 256 using a step size 200 with 10
Mel-frequencies.
Certifying speech classifier For this experiment, we
trained an LSTM network with two LSTM layers and
32 hidden units, preceded by a 40 ReLU-activated fully-
connected layer. This network achieves accuracy of 92%
on the FSDD task. The average number of frames was
14.7, which is double compared to the previous task on the
MNIST dataset.
We use the same decibel (dB) perturbation metric as
(Carlini & Wagner, 2018). Given a speech signal s, a deci-
bel of perturbation δ is defined as:
dB(s) = max
i
20 · log10 |si|; dBs(δ) = dB(δ) − dB(s).
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We show the results in Fig. 8. We vary the decibel per-
turbation between -100 dB and -60 dB and evaluate preci-
sion and runtime of R2. Fig. 8a shows percentage of certi-
fied samples: our method based on optimizing the bounds
(OPT) performs best, e.g., certifying 20% more samples
than LP for a significant perturbation of -60 dB. In terms
of runtime, Fig. 8b shows that the OPT runtime increases
with the perturbation magnitude, meaning that the opti-
mizer needs more iterations to converge to the resulting
bounds.
6. Conclusion
We presented a novel approach for certifying recurrent neu-
ral networks based on a combination of linear program-
ming and optimization. The key idea was to compute a
convex relaxation of the non-linear operations found in the
recurrent cells and to be able to dynamically adjust this re-
laxation according to each input example being certified.
Our experimental results indicate that R2 is both more pre-
cise and more scalable than prior work, while offering guar-
antees on convergence. Thanks to these advances, using
R2, we were able to certify, for the first time, the robust-
ness of LSTMs used in speech recognition.
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A. Details on Offset Adjustment
A.1. Boundings for σ(x) tanh(y)
Here we provide details of Step 2 from Section 3.1. Let
x ∈ [lx, ux], y ∈ [ly, uy], andAlx+Bly+Cl be the initial
lower bounding plane obtained from LP. We define F (x, y)
as:
F (x, y) = σ(x) tanh(y)− (Alx+Bly + Cl)
To find ∆l = maxx,y F (x, y), we first find the extreme
points by computing partial derivatives.
∂F
∂x
= σ(x) tanh(y)(1− σ(x)) −Al (3)
∂F
∂y
= σ(x) tanh(y)(1− tanh2(y))−Bl (4)
Case 1: x ∈ {lx, ux} Under this condition, we denote
Sx := σ(x) as a constant. To ease the notation, let t =
tanh(y) where t ∈ [tanh(ly), tanh(uy)]. Then ∂F∂y
!
= 0
can be rewritten as
t(1− t2) =
Bl
Sx
(5)
Case 2: y ∈ {ly, uy} Here we set Ty := tanh(y) and
s = σ(x), x ∈ [σ(lx), σ(ux)] analogously. ∂F∂x
!
= 0 can be
rewritten as
s(1− s) =
Al
Ty
(6)
Case 3: otherwise Otherwise, we consider both ∂F
∂x
!
= 0
and ∂F
∂y
!
= 0. By combining Eq. (3) and Eq. (4), we reduce
tanh(y) and obtain
s4+(−2−Bl)s
3+(1+2Bl)s
2+(−Bl)s−A
2
l
!
= 0 (7)
The proper roots of above expressions make up the candi-
dates for the extreme points of F . Hence, it is sufficient to
compare the value of F at the roots of Eq. (5), Eq. (6), and
Eq. (7), and the 4 corner coordinates to get ∆l in the given
domain. By replacing Cl ← Cl − ∆l, modified F is no
greater than 0, which means the plane is always equal or
strictly below the σ(x) tanh(y) curve.
We can follow the analogous process for the upper bound
of the curve.
A.2. Boundings for σ(x)y
We briefly note that another operation, σ(x)y, appearing in
LSTM cell, is generally similar to the case of σ(x) tanh(y),
but there is no need to calculate inner-border extreme
points. Let G(x, y) = σ(x)y − (Alx+Bly + Cl).
∂G
∂x
= σ(x)y(1 − σ(x)) −Al (8)
∂G
∂y
= σ(x) −Bl (9)
Case 1: x ∈ {lx, ux} When σ(x) is fixed, Eq. (9) is con-
stant, which means G is monotonous in this case.
Case 2: y ∈ {ly, uy} Denote s = σ(x) where s ∈
[σ(lx), σ(ux)], then setting Eq. (8)
!
= 0 becomes
s(1− s) =
Al
y
(10)
Case 3: otherwise If there is a local extremum in the
region, Hessian of G must be either positive-definite or
negative-definite.
∂2G
∂x2
= σ(x)y(1 − σ(x))(1 − 2σ(x))
∂2G
∂y2
= 0
∂2G
∂x∂y
= σ(x)(1 − σ(x))
∂2G
∂x2
·
∂2G
∂y2
−
(
∂2G
∂x∂y
)2
= − (σ(x)(1 − σ(x)))
2
< 0
Hence, there is no local maximum inside the boundaries.
Wrapping up, we only need to consider the roots of the
Eq. (10) and the 4 corners to calculate the maximum of
G to get ∆l for σ(x)y. Upper bound is analogous to this
calculations.
By above mentioned offset adjustment by∆l or∆u (for up-
per bounding plane), Our proposed planes are guaranteed
to ensure soundness.
B. Asymptotic Optimality of LP boundings
To provide guarantees on our bounds, we apply the follow-
ing theorem from Balunovic et al. (2019):
Theorem 1. Let N be the number of points sampled in
our algorithm and ǫ the tolerance used in the Lipschitz
optimization. Let (ωl, bl) be our lower constraint and let
(ω∗, b∗) be the minimum of L. For every δ > 0 there exists
Nδ such that |L(ωl, bl) − L(ω
∗, b∗)| < δ + ǫ for every
N > Nδ , with high probability. Analogous result holds for
upper constraint (ωu, bu) and function U.
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where, roughly saying, L =
∫
(x,y) F (x, y) and analogous
for the upper bound case U , and (ωl, bl) are our Al, Bl, Cl.
As we do not perform the Lipschitz optimization, but in-
stead compute the closed-form solution, our approximation
corresponds to the case ǫ = 0 here, and the theorem guar-
antees the asymptotic optimality of our bounds.
